US History/US History (Bureau Development Inc.)(1991).ISO/dp/0147/01479.txt

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$Unique_ID{USH01479}
$Pretitle{128}
$Title{The Amphibians Came to Conquer:  Volume 2
Chapter 22B  Notable Features of Guam Assault}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Dyer, VAdm. George C.}
$Affiliation{USN}
$Subject{tinian
beach
admiral
beaches
white
saipan
assault
landing
japanese
yards}
$Volume{Vol. 2}
$Date{1973}
$Log{}
Book:        The Amphibians Came to Conquer:  Volume 2
Author:      Dyer, VAdm. George C.
Affiliation: USN
Volume:      Vol. 2
Date:        1973

Chapter 22B  Notable Features of Guam Assault

     Various aspects of the Guam operation impressed the amphibians who fought
throughout the twenty-day assault.  One of the more junior participants
recorded an observation that was echoed by his seniors:

The outstanding feature of the operation with the exception of the assault
phase, was the excellent performance of the LST's, loaded down with troops,
and the small craft in company, maintaining themselves at sea for twenty-six
continuous days without suffering critically in material or morale or health
of troops and crews.

     Others thought the assault landing on Guam was notable because:

1.  Not a single piece of enemy artillery was brought to bear on the
transports, or the first of the assault waves.

2.  Fighter aircraft armed with rockets took over much of the bombing
previously allocated to dive bombers.  (SB2Cs).

3.  The Underwater Demolition Teams, aided by heavy protective fire, were able
to undertake three days and three nights of large scale demolition of natural
and artificial obstacles.  In this connection Commander Southern Attack Force
reported:  "Landings could not have been made on either north or south beaches
nor any other suitable beaches without these elaborate but successfully
prosecuted clearance operations."

4.  The air bombardment was the heaviest of the war because all four of the
fast carrier task groups as well as twenty four jeep carriers were available
to conduct it in the days immediately before and after the assault landings.

5.  The logistic support landed during the first four days of the assault
averaged 10,000 tons.

6.  All landing craft had to be unloaded at the outer edge of the reef.

     The amphibians were not pestered with Japanese air, submarine, or surface
fleet attacks which was another reason all went well within Task Force 53.

     As Rear Admiral Conolly, with real euphoria, wrote when the operation was
all over:

The Naval Forces were filled with the conviction that nothing was to be spared
to land successfully and to support effectively the fine troops that were to
assault and capture the island objective.

     CINCPAC's victory message after the reconquest of Guam was completed said
this:

Operation was brilliantly and valorously conducted and resulted in the
recovery of important American Territory and the Liberation of a loyal people.
Well Done.

Tinian

     The Tinian amphibious assault is principally noteworthy for the first use
of the napalm flame bomb and for the long and bitter discussion which preceded
the drafting of the final plans for the assault.  The professional argument
concerned which beaches should be used.

     Both the early and final plans called for a 'shore to shore' amphibious
movement in part, rather than a simon pure 'ship to shore' amphibious
movement, since the two Marine Divisions who would conduct the assault landing
were those that had fought on Saipan and were on Saipan.  This meant that
somewhat more than one division was to be out-lifted from Saipan directly to
Tinian in LCI's, in landing boats, or in amtracs and DUKW's carried aboard
LST's
and LCT's.

The United States Commanders

     Vice Admiral Turner set the style in utilizing the great competence of
available subordinates.  Rear Admiral Harry W. Hill was handed the ball for
Tinian and told to run with it.  This, as Commander Northern Attack Force and
Commander Task Force 52, he did to the satisfaction of Vice Admiral Turner.
Not to be outdone, Lieutenant General H. M. Smith, USMC, in due time, passed
command of the Northern Troops and Landing Force to Major General Harry
Schmidt, USMC, who had commanded the Fourth Marine Division during the capture
of Saipan.  Major General Clifton B. Cates was assigned to command the Fourth
Division and the Second Marine Division continued under the command of Major
General Thomas E. Watson.

     The naval forces participating in the Tinian assault, by and large, were
those that had assaulted Saipan, except for the large attack transports and
attack cargo ships which had left the Marianas and returned at best speed to
Pearl Harbor to embark the 77th Infantry Division and their impedimenta for
the delayed Guam assault.

     Rear Admiral Hill recalls that he received advance notice of his new
chore on 2 July 1944, and despatch orders on 5 July.  On 6 July, Commander
Saipan Island relieved Rear Admiral Hill of the task of unloading all ships
off Saipan, thus relieving him of one of his major tasks, which had kept him
busy as a cat on a hot tin roof since 15 June.

     As an indication of how the Tinian assault was completely in the hands of
Rear Admiral Hill, it is noted here that Vice Admiral Turner was at Guam in
the Rocky Mount when the Tinian assault was actually launched.  He had left
Saipan in time to join Rear Admiral Conolly in the Northern Transport Area for
the assault landing on Guam on 21 July 1944.  He stayed at Guam until after
the first assault landing had been made on Tinian on 24 July, arriving back at
Saipan the next day.

     Even after Vice Admiral Turner's return to the Tinian-Saipan area, Rear
Admiral Hill "retained the responsibility for offensive and defensive surface
and air action in this area."

The Japanese Commanders

     On the day before the landing, Vice Admiral Turner's staff recorded:

Based on data obtained from captured documents, and upon POW interrogations,
it is estimated that enemy combat strength on Tinian is about 9,000, exclusive
of approximately 9,000 Home Guards.

     The Headquarters of the Japanese First Air Fleet was on Tinian and its
commander, Vice Admiral Kakuji Kakuda, was among those on the island when we
landed on 24 July 1944.  He had tried on several successive nights to keep a
rendezvous with a rescue submarine but his rubber boat never located the
submarine.  Colonel Kiyochi Ogato commanded the Japanese Army's 50th Regiment.
Captain Goichi Oya, IJN, commanded the Japanese Navy's 56th Guard Force.
These two backbone units of the 9,000-man Tinian Defense Force were about
equally matched in personnel strength.  Colonel Ogata was the overall
commander.

     The 56th Naval Guard Force manned the three 6-inch coast defense guns of
British manufacture, as well as the ten 14-centimeter (5.5") coast defense
guns, the ten 12-centimeter (4.6") dual-purpose guns and the four
76-millimeter (3.0") dual-purpose guns collectively protecting the island from
sea or air assault.

A Few More Physical Facts

     In comparison with Saipan and Guam, Tinian Island was fairly flat and
fairly open.  It was mainly given over to the cultivation of sugar cane.
Aerial photographs of the island looked like a giant checkerboard stilted
upwards by coral cliffs rising directly from the ocean, except in the area
around Tinian town.  This stilting was unfortunate from an amphibious assault
point of view, since the cliffs were roughly from ten to one hundred feet
high.  In general, the east coast of Tinian was more rugged than the west
coast.

Selecting the Landing Beaches

     There were only three possible landing areas on Tinian:  Sunharon Bay on
the southwest coast, Asiga Bay on the east central coast, and the White Beach
area in northwest Tinian.  White Beach One and White Beach Two in northwest
Tinian were about 1000 yards apart.

     In Sunharon Bay there were four landing areas which had been designated
for planning purposes:  Orange, Red, Green, and Blue.  Red and Green each had
two beaches.  Blue Beach, a mile south of the piers in Tinian Town, was 600
yards long.  Green Beach One, in the center of Tinian Town and between the
only two piers, was 600 yards long.  Green Beach Two at the southern end of
Tinian Town was 400 yards long.  Red Beach One and Red Beach Two north of the
piers totaled 825 yards.  Orange Beach was half a mile north of Red Beach One
and 340 yards long.

     In Asiga Bay Yellow Beach One was 355 yards long and Yellow Beach Two,
200 yards long.  Cliffs flanked both the Yellow beaches and heavy surf pounded
them whenever the wind was from the east.

     The northeast trades were prevailing in July 1944.

     All four of the beaches in Sunharon Bay had something to recommend them
even though the two best ones and the closest to Tinian Town piers were
something less than excellent.

     Admiral Turner wrote of these beaches (Red and Green):

The actual beaches with practicable exits for vehicles were rather short and
scattered; the reefs in many respects were even worse than those at Saipan,
and the high flanking artillery positions at both ends were threatening
indeed.  This beach [area] however, had two very definite advantages; 1st, it
did not have the extensive swamp and wide low land back of it that had proved
so troublesome at Saipan, but the land rise from the beach was short, and 2nd,
once a beachhead had been gained, there was quite a good small craft harbor
with a narrow entrance, and behind a very shallow protective reef that would
have permitted unloading in all but seriously heavy weather.

     The Japanese were fully aware that the beaches off Tinian Town were
inviting.  Our aerial reconnaissance showed they were making real last-minute
efforts to improve their defensive stance in this and the Yellow Beach area.
Further:

A captured order of the Tinian Garrison force dated 1900 25 June . . .
indicated that our attack was anticipated at Tinian Town and Asiga Bay areas.

     This captured order was only one of the intelligence nuggets dug out of
documents extensive enough to fill 75 mail bags and 54 crates which were
garnered during the Saipan operation.

     That the Japanese expected our assault to touch down at Tinian Town or
just possibly at Asiga Bay was a good reason for not making it at either of
these locations.  But the alternatives were something less than an amphibians
dream beach.

The Alternatives

     White Beach One was almost directly west of the main runway of Ushi Point
airfield and about six miles due north of Tinian Town.  The fringing reef was
of dead coral about 75 yards wide.  At the seaward end of the reef the water
was 3 1/2 feet deep at high tide.  The reef bared itself at low tide.

     White Beach One was only 65 to 75 yards long and 15 to 20 yards deep.
But the relatively smooth off-lying reef shelf was about 300 yards long and it
was believed that LVT's and LCVP's could land troops right on this reef shelf
and they could wade ashore to the small smooth sand beach area.

     There was a narrow, rough road leading from the southern end of White
Beach One toward the Ushi point airfield.  However, movement up and out the
exits from the beach to the plateau on which the airfield had been built was
generally difficult due to boulders, a steep rise, and heavy brush.  There
were some horned mines off the beach, but it was discovered that these were
largely inoperative.

     White Beach Two was wider than White Beach One.  As Rear Admiral Hill
described this beach in his attack order:

The beach is 15-17 yards in width, 200 yards long, and sandy and smooth except
for a few scattered rocks . . . .  On the left northern part is a ledge of
dead coral about 2 1/2 feet high, which could be easily taken out by a
bulldozer tank or tetrytol charges.  It is believed that with the aid of
demolition and a bulldozer tank, 200 yards of beach can be made available for
a landing . . . .

     However, at White Beach One:

A narrow rough road leads from the southern end of the beach toward the
airfields.

     White Beach Two had two rows of mines offshore and box mines covered the
exits.

The Planning for White Beach Landings

     Less than seven years after the assault landing on the White Beach areas
on Tinian, Vice Admiral Harry W. Hill wrote in regard to his own planning
effort and that of other commands involved in the task of capturing Tinian:

If there were plans, and I presume there were some tentative ones, none of
them were available to me or my staff.  We started from the beginning and
after our study of all possible landing places came to a completely
independent conclusion that the two small northwest beaches were the best
places to land from the naval point of view provided the approaches to them
were not too bad.

Admiral Hill's recollections in 1966 were:

As my staff began its study of Tinian and its beaches, all they had to go on
was Turner's conclusion that we must land at Tinian Town and Holland Smith's
hope that we could land on the northern beaches.  The responsibility was mine
alone, subject to Turner's approval.

     The two big advantages for the northwest beaches which everyone
immediately recognized were that they were within range of direct artillery
support from Saipan, and that they were on the lea side of Tinian.

     The tremendous disadvantages, which were weighed differently by each
commander, were their extremely small frontage and their narrow steep exits.
Previous experience had been that a division commander with troops to land
generally started looking for a beach a mile or more long with many exits.  He
started getting unhappy if there were only 1,000 yards of beach and two good
exits, and was really jumping up and down if the beach area narrowed below 500
yards and had only one good exit.

     Both Major General Schmidt and Rear Admiral Hill and their staffs were
convinced that the White Beaches were usable.  To obtain the essential
approval of Commander Expeditionary Force that preliminary planning be
undertaken while reconnaissance by Marines and UDT5 went forward, Rear Admiral
Hill visited Vice Admiral Turners' flagship.  He tells his story:

The next day I went to Turner to give him this data and to outline our views
in regard to using the White beaches.  To my consternation and dismay, he was
adamantly opposed to even thinking of the White beaches, and gave me positive
orders to stop all planning for such a landing.

It was a very explosive conference and placed me in a most embarrassing
situation.

In vain I tried to convince him that, pending report of reconnaissance, we
should explore the possibilities of those beaches along with the others.  I
returned to the Cambria in a state of perplexity.  Here I was, charged with
the sole responsibility of planning, but ordered to prepare a plan that
neither I nor Harry Schmidt liked.  I could fully appreciate Turner's fear of
trying to use these little handkerchief sized beaches, but realized that we
had considered all angles of the problems much more fully than he had.  Yet he
was a man of such proven wisdom and Judgment that it created many doubts in my
mind as to the correctness of my thinking.  On the long boat ride back to the
Cambria I came to the conclusion that despite his decision, we should explore
further the feasibility of the White Beach plan.  So I split my staff into two
groups, one to work on the White Beach plan, and one to develop the Tinian
Town plan - with a view to delaying the final decision.

To assist in the planning, I requested Captain [Armand] Robertson, who would
be my LST Squadron Commander, to temporarily transfer to the Cambria.  He was
a very capable and experienced officer, and his timely recommendations and
thorough planning proved to be a most valuable contribution to the success of
the operation.

     One of the controlling factors to be considered in the planning was how
great the logistic support build-up for the Landing Force had to be, and that
depended on how quickly the island could be captured.  Major General Schmidt
estimated eight days would be required.

Reconnaissance

     On the nights of 10-11 July and 11-12 July 1944, personnel from the
Underwater Demolition Teams and from the Marine Reconnaissance Battalion took
a "look-see" at the White and Yellow Beaches.

     What they found in the Yellow Beach area was enough for a permanent
thumbs down on using these beaches.  The report stated there were moored
mines, pot holes, large boulders, barbed wire on the beaches, and the sound of
construction activity just inland.  The report was most unfavorable.

     Of the west coast beaches, only White Beach One was examined the first
night, because the reconnaissance teams did not touch down on White Beach Two,
having been swept north of it by the strong inshore current.  The report on
White Beach One and its approaches was favorable.

     The next night (11-12 July) the reconnaissance teams returned to their
chores and this night made a close examination of White Beach Two.  This beach
was poor but usable.  The reconnaissance personnel thought that fissures along
the outer edge of the underwater reef shelf might be a hazard to amtracs at
low tide.  A quite real shore-side hazard was a string of land mines flanking
the desired landing area.

     With this information at hand and digested, Rear Admiral Hill returned to
the Rocky Mount, hoping to receive a "go ahead" signal from the big boss.  He
had no such luck.

He simply would not listen, and again ordered me in very positive terms to
stop all White Beach planning and to issue my plan for the Tinian Town
landing, which had already been prepared.

Instead of returning to Cambria, I went ashore and explained the situation to
Holland Smith, who had always been in favor of the White beaches if we could
make a workable plan.  Then I went to see Spruance.  To him I outlined my
plan, its many advantages over any other landing point, and told him of my two
discussions with Turner.  Spruance liked the boldness and surprise element of
the plan as outlined.  He said he would call a conference - I think for the
same afternoon - to settle the matter.

At the conference were Holland Smith, Harry Schmidt, Watson, Hill and Turner.
There was a full and frank discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of
each plan, and then Spruance called for a vote.  [Starting with the junior]
Four affirmative votes were cast for the White Beach plan, and then he turned
to Turner.  I held my breath, but Turner quietly said that he also approved
it.  What a great relief that was for us all.

     In this connection, the memory of a somewhat younger man is also
recorded:

During the Saipan-Tinian Operation, I was Operations Officer for the Landing
Force [Lieutenant General Smith] and we ran head on into Admiral Turner in
planning for Tinian.  Admiral Turner wanted to land on the good beaches
(strongly defended) at Tinian Town.  The Landing Force wished to land on the
narrow and very poor beaches (relatively undefended) near the north end of
Tinian.  The latter beaches could be dominated by our ready placed artillery
on the south coast of Saipan, and we were convinced we could negotiate the
beaches as a result of our UDT and beach reconnaissance.  But Admiral Turner
would not give in.

On the last possible day of decision General Holland Smith, his CIS, his G-2,
and I went out from Saipan to Admiral Turner's flagship expecting a knock down
fight.  We were prepared to press our plan in great detail and in the
strongest terms.  As soon as our plan was stated in outline, Admiral Turner
turned to General Smith and said:  'I can support your plan, I approve.'

     General Hogaboom added to this scribe:

I think Admiral Turner was very concerned over the logistic support phases of
the operation, and as soon as the very special arrangements which we had made
had been detailed to him, he became convinced of the practicability of using
the White Beaches and approved.

     Admiral Spruance's remembrance of this important conference is that:

He refrained from giving his decision until all had presented their views and
was relieved of what would have been the disagreeable necessity of overruling
trusted Kelly Turner, when the latter agreed to make the decision unanimous
for the White beaches.

     Admiral Turner's remembrance of the controversy was mellow.  In 1950, he
wrote:

I merely insisted that full study and consideration be given, before decision,
to all possible landing places . . . all of them difficult for more than one
reason.  And, in accordance with an invariable custom, I refused to give a
decision until such studies had been made, and also until the main feature of
the landing plan had been developed.

     Admiral Hill in 1967 added:

I never saw Kelly when he was so mean and cantankerous as on these two
occasions.  It just wasn't like him.  He must have been a bit under the
weather, although I didn't detect it at the time.

     In any case there were twelve days between the taking of the final
decision as to beaches and the actual assault, and this allowed ten days of
full speed ahead preparation.

Ten Days of Preparation

     On 12 July Rear Admiral Hill was directed to assume command of the Tinian
Attack Force (TF 52) and to capture, occupy, and defend Tinian.

     The loading operation commenced on 15 July in Tanapag Harbor, Saipan,
with LST's, and continued through 23 July with LCT's, LCM's, LCVP's, and
pontoon barges being loaded in the latter part of this period.  Rear Admiral
Hills report stated:

Physical loading was accomplished with a minimum of difficulty, the beaches
and harbor facilities at Saipan proving adequate to handle the loading.

     Craft involved in the movement from Saipan to Tinian were 537 amtracs,
130 DUKW's, 100 LCVP's, 92 LCM's, 37 LST's, 31 LCI's, 20 LCT's, and 14 pontoon
barges plus 6 APA's, 2 AP's, and 2 LSD's.

     To permit bombardment ships to do their work close to shore, the
minesweepers swept to within five hundred yards and found no mines on the west
coast of Tinian.  They did their sweeping off Tinian Town on the day before
the assault (Jig Day) in order to foster the impression that the Marines were
going to land there soon.  The mineable waters off the White Beaches were
limited and these were not swept until Jig Day, beginning at 0600.  The only
mines swept in the whole Tinian Area were 17 in Asiga Bay off the Yellow
Beaches, and these were not swept until after the assault landing.

     Day time UDT reconnaissance of the beaches off Tinian Town was also
carried out on Jig Day minus one.  And, more importantly, a logistic support
plan was developed which it was hoped would move all the essentials across the
narrow White beaches on wheels or tractors directly to the divisional dumps.
This was to prevent any large amount of logistic support piling up on the
beach during a rehandling operation.  Everything that could be was pre-loaded
onto the DUKWs or tractors which would carry it direct to the divisional dump.

Rehearsal

     No rehearsal for Tinian was scheduled or held.  Admiral Hill wrote:

Naturally there had been no opportunity for rehearsals, but there had been
close liaison among all commands throughout the planning period, and Captain
Robertson had followed through thoroughly on all the complex cargo handling
procedures.

The Day of the Assault - Tinian

     Two LCI(G)'s described the early stages of the assault:

At the time of the attack, it had stopped raining, but the sky was overcast
and there was still a gentle easterly breeze.  Visibility was fair except on
the beach.  There, the smoke and dust raised by preliminary bombardment made
it impossible to distinguish the shoreline.

                  *         *         *         *         *

. . . Because of a strong wind and current from the northeast direction,
station keeping at the line of departure was practically impossible . . . .
Because of the terrific barrage laid down by guns from Saipan and also our
Naval gunfire, it was impossible to see the beach.  We had been warned
beforehand of such a possibility and, if it occurred, to fire rockets when the
LCI(G)-77 fired hers, because that ship had radar and this ship hasn't.  This
was done.  The effects were not noticeable because of visibility . . . .

     Even more than at Saipan, the gun support just prior to the assault was
pretty much "by guess and by God" at least for the smaller ships which did not
have radar.  The report of the LCI Group Commanders indicates the problem:

This Group formed on a line of departure, five ships abreast in the first
line, three ships abreast, 200 yards astern in the second line.  As ships left
the line of departure at 0819 and proceeded toward the beach, smoke became too
thick to see rocket ranging shots.  So radar was used to pick up [the] beach
line.  Results proved satisfactory as other ships observed time of firing on
radar equipped flagship and judged their fire accordingly.  LCI's in second
line fired rockets after first line cleared.  40mm and 20mm guns were fired at
beach area as no specific targets could be seen.

Preliminary Air and Gun Bombardment

     One hundred fifty-six Army and Marine Corps guns and howitzers were
ranged along southern Saipan to carry out the systematic bombardment of every
worthwhile target that air reconnaissance could discover within their range,
which was about seven and a half miles.  This was roughly the northern half of
Tinian since Tinian lay from three to three and a half miles south of Saipan.
Air and naval gun bombardment had responsibility for the southern half plus
any guns located in the cliffs of Tinian.

     U.S. gunners scored an early success since:

According to information from a prisoner of war, Vice Admiral Kakuda,
Commander First Air Fleet, and Colonel Ogata [Commanding Officer 50th Infantry
Regiment] were both killed by artillery fire on Jig Day.

     The Japanese on Tinian were as secretive as their comrades on Guam, and
reluctant to engage in shooting matches.  Consequently, as late as Jig Day,
well camouflaged large Japanese guns were being discovered in addition to
small machine guns.

     One Japanese 20-millimeter gun near the White Beach had survived all the
preliminary air and gun bombardments.  It came to life on 24 July as the
following report indicates:

At 0735 all ships were ready to launch.  At about 0745 the right flank of the
formation was fired upon . . . [by] a 20mm gun . . . .  The fire was too close
for comfort . . . .  At 0758 a hit causing 4 casualties was observed on the
signal bridge of LST 272.  The same burst struck the LST forward . . . .
Another burst . . . resulted in a hit on LST 340 causing an additional 4
casualties and on subsequent bursts, at least one hit was observed on a line
of LVT's on starboard bow of LST-225 . . . .  Considering the character of the
main deck cargo (gasoline drums and ammunition) it was an unpleasant 15
minutes . . . .

     Besides the 20-millimeter gun shooting at LST's, the larger ships were
not immune from Japanese guns with greater weight of shell.

The Colorado (OBB-45) was hit 22 times by what is believed to have been a
battery of six-inch coastal guns.  178 casualties were suffered which included
two officers and 42 enlisted men killed.  The Norman Scott (DD-690) was badly
hit.  She suffered 19 killed, including the Captain, and 47 wounded.

     As Admiral Hill told me:

It certainly was an unusual sight to see those two tiny groups of 8 LVT and 16
LVT abreast take off from the Line of Departure for beaches White One and
White Two respectively.  Never had such an insignificant First Wave started a
major offensive operation . . . .

At 0742 the First Wave hit White One, but not until eight minutes later did
the First Wave arrive at White Two.  This discrepancy had been caused by an
unexpectedly strong current running at the time, which in the dust cloud and
despite the guide boats and Mustang runs, caused them to drift off course, and
require constant redirection.

     The assault landing went remarkably well.  A tactical surprise had been
obtained and held for some hours, because the demonstration landing off Tinian
Town by the transports and related craft and the heavy air and gun bombardment
of the Tinian Town area convinced the Japanese command that the main landing
would turn out to be there.  Consequently, one of the three battalions of the
50th Infantry Regiment was held in defensive position at Tinian Town all
through Jig Day.

     Seven of the fourteen large transports and cargo ships still in Saipan
waters, with the Second Marine Division embarked, carried out this useful
demonstration off Tinian Town early on Jig Day.  Following this demonstration,
the Second Division was assault landed on the White beaches as soon as the
Fourth Division had climbed through the narrow exits back of the beaches.  The
27th Infantry Division was held on Saipan in Landing Force Reserve but
prepared to embark on four hours' notice, to land on Tinian.

     By almost superhuman efforts the amphibians had landed the entire Fourth
Division and one battalion of the Second Division by dark, including 48 tanks,
the 77-millimeter pack howitzers, their many bulldozers, cherry picker cranes,
and much hot cargo.  A goodly share of the 15 dead from the first day's
spirited assault were personnel in the two amtracs blown up by mines on White
Beach Two.

     Once a counterattack led by heavy tanks about 0300 on Jig Day plus one
had been broken up and turned back in full retreat (although breaching our
outer lines initially), the worst of the battle for Tinian was over.

     Fortunately, the quick overrunning of the airfield permitted cargo
planes to provide emergency logistic support by shuttle planes.

     At 1800 on Jig Day plus Four (28 July) all unloading had to be stopped
because of rising surf.  Our planes were already landing on Aslito airstrip,
so while it could not be said that all was in hand logistic-wise, emergency
logistic support by shuttle plane could be promised the Marines by the
amphibians.  The unloading situation at this time was described by the
Amphibious Group Two War Diary:

Heavy swells and accompanying high winds have prevented all unloading except
by DUKWs and LVT's.  If unsatisfactory sea conditions persist, plans have been
made to launch emergency supplies by air.

                  *         *         *         *         *

As of 2400, all ships were on 15-minute notice preparatory to getting underway
in case of heavy weather - increasing wind velocity and consequent rise in
height of swells.

     General Schmidt's troops made 100 percent correct his estimate of eight
days to complete the capture.  On 1 August 1944, Tinian was declared secure,
and the napalm flame bomb a "moderate success."

     The amphibians had had a few bad moments before this happened, and these
had been primarily because of weather.

     The LST-340, despite the fact that the Commanding Officer "acted in a
cool and seamanlike manner," 7 broached and was lost as an operating ship.
Numerous LCVP were lost and larger landing craft damaged.

Logistics - Tinian

     Commander LST Group 39 was directed by Rear Admiral Hill to make a quick
collection of hydrographic data for use in the planned early beachings of
LST's in the White Beach area.  Lieutenant Commander J. B. Hoyt, USNR, in his
report wrote:

On arrival at the beach, it was felt that perhaps the moment had not been well
chosen.  A brisk engagement was being fought between a Marine tank equipped
with a flame thrower and a Jap machine gun nest about so yards from the
northern corner of the beach.  Marines were cleaning out the caves exposed by
low water, working methodically south from the right-hand corner.  Some
Japanese in the rear of the caves were plainly visible but fortunately did not
wish to call undue attention to themselves by indulging in target practice to
seaward.  Soundings were taken at 30 foot intervals over a front of
approximately 150 yards from 300 feet out to the beach itself . . . .  [I]
reported that beaching was impracticable and recommended the use of a pontoon
causeway.

     Pontoon causeways were used as this report showed:

The improvement in this respect was extraordinary.  In spite of narrow
beachheads, 38 LST's unloaded in 3 days at Tinian an amount that took over 8
days at Saipan.

                  *         *         *         *         *

The Medical Plan, unsatisfactory to a high degree at Saipan, was amended for
Tinian, proved excellent.

     The excellence of the logistic support rendered at Tinian, despite the
handkerchief beaches and the scanty exits, was the most marked characteristic
of the Tinian assault.

     As a Marine recipient of this excellence wrote:

This operation was in many ways a remarkable demonstration of the fact that
preconceived notions and amphibious doctrine [actually he meant technique] can
be altered rapidly on the spot.  In effect a reenforced corps was landed over
less than 200 yards of beach and over a difficult reef, and was supplied
through nine days of heavy combat, without handling so much as one pound of
supplies in the usual shore party manner.  Everything rolled on wheels
. . . .  The troops never lacked what they required at the time it was
required.

LST's - A High Mark

     The LST's were almost uniformerly praised for the manner in which they
had carried out their difficult chore in Forager.  But, that they had not
quite reached perfection is indicated by the following comment:

LST Commanding Officers are still short on seamanship and punch too many holes
in the sides of ships they come alongside.  The approved method of stopping
the ship when coming alongside seems to be by ramming rather than depending
upon the screws; this does the trick all right, but is rather severe upon the
recipient of the blow.

End Result of the Marianas Campaign

     On 10 August 1944, CTF 51 logged in his War Diary that:

5,544 enemy dead have been buried, interned civilians number 13,262 and 404
POWs including 150 Koreans have been taken.

     The Marines' Saipan logs 5,614 as the total Japanese military casualties
on Tinian through 3 August 1944.  The Army's Campaign in the Marianas gives no
exact figures but states that the Japanese on Tinian lost more than 8,000.
The comparative large discrepancies between "bodies buried" and "estimated
Japanese military strength on Tinian" are one of the unexplained aspects of
the Marianas campaign.

     On 8 August 1944, Admiral Spruance declared that the capture and
occupation phase of Saipan and Tinian would be considered complete at noon on
10 August.

     Despite the unfortunate furor raised later by the relief of an Infantry
Division's Commanding General on Saipan by the Commander Fifth Fleet, the
Commander Expeditionary Troops (Lieutenant General H. M. Smith, USMC) reported
that one of the three factors decisive in the successful execution of the
Marianas operation was:

(a).  The unprecedented degree of coordination between all Services
throughout.  This was based on all-around cooperation and understanding, and
cemented by mutual respect and confidence, which has developed through a
series of operations and has welded one experienced team from many varying
elements.

Logistics - Forager

     Looking at Forager as a whole, Fleet Admiral Nimitz's Staff wrote:

In the Marianas Operation . . . any narrative would be incomplete without at
least a brief description of the logistic support provided to maintain 600
ships and an estimated 300,000 naval, marine, and army personnel at over 1000
miles from our nearest base and 6000 miles from the United States.

     Some idea of the magnitude of the Forager logistic problem can be
obtained from CINCPAC's order to Commander Service Force Pacific to have 21
Fleet oilers available to support that part of the Pacific Fleet participating
in Forager.  These oilers had to be prepared to deliver to these ships
158,800,000 gallons of fuel oil during each two-week period commencing 1 June
1944.

     The logistics problem was eased by the availability for the first time of
Fleet repair facilities at Majuro, Kwajalein, and Eniwetok in the Central
Pacific, as well as at Seadler Harbor, Manus Island in the Southwest Pacific
Area.

     Six hospital ships were available in the Central Pacific to take care of
the wounded and the sick, as well as mobile and base
hospitals having over 10,000 beds in the South Pacific Area.

     Nearly everyone agreed that the logistic support in Forager had been
pretty remarkable.  However, there were still some improvements possible.
Rear Admiral Hill, who had been neck deep in logistics at Saipan and Tinian
wrote:

Positive measures must be taken in future operations to provide adequate
unloading on the beaches at an early date so that assault and garrison
shipping may be unloaded at a maximum rate . . . .  It is a matter of record
that on Dog plus Twelve Day, when the unloading of the first garrison echelon
was at its height, there were 13 cranes working on the beaches of which 9 had
been provided by the Navy.

Forager and the Japanese

     As far as is known the Japanese were both strategically and tactically
surprised by the assault on Saipan, although the concentration of Task Force
58 at Majuro in the Marshalls had been "discovered by Lieutenant Takehilo
Chihaya in an extraordinary aerial reconnaissance."

     According to a brief note on 4 June 1944 in Admiral Nimitz's Command
Summary presumably based on Japanese radio traffic:

The enemy considers it possible that another striking force sortied from
Majuro during the night of 4-5 June.

     But many in the Japanese Navy except for Commander Chikataka Nakajima,
Intelligence Officer on the Staff of the Combined Fleet, thought our
amphibious assault was headed for the Palau Islands or the islands between New
Guinea and the Philippines.

The Importance of the Marianas Operation

     Vice Admiral Turner wrote:

I consider the Marianas Campaign, in its entirety, to be perhaps the best
rounded historical example of a purely amphibious operation designed for other
than local ultimate military purpose.  It had everything.  The strategic
developments both before and after that campaign are highly interesting and
significant.

     The Forager Operation was the largest amphibious operation of the Pacific
War up to June 1944.  It was not the longest - since Guadalcanal had lasted
from 8 August 1942 through 8 February 1943 - but it had even more strategic
significance than Guadalcanal.  When we took Guadalcanal, we broke through the
Japanese outer line of defense.  When we took the Marianas, we broke through
the Japanese inner line of defense.

     Admiral Turner was quoted by the Army and Navy Journal in 1945 as having
said that the capture of the Marianas was the turning point of war in the
Pacific.  He was far from alone in that military judgment, although the public
has been told far more frequently that Midway marked that important corner.
It is believed that after Midway the United States Navy turned from defensive
operations to offensive operations.  After Guadalcanal, the Japanese Navy
turned from offensive operations to defensive operations, but after the
Marianas all of the Japanese military largely resigned themselves to eventual
defeat.  The Marianas was a major turning point in that important respect.

     Vice Admiral Shigeyoshi Miwa, who commanded Japan's submarine fleet at
the end of the war, put the situation in a nutshell when he opined:

Our war was lost with the loss of Saipan.

     General Holland M. Smith also put the matter succinctly:

I have always considered Saipan the decisive battle of the Pacific offensive.

     As Fleet Admiral King wrote:

The Japanese, like the United States Navy, realized that the Mariana Islands
were the key to the Pacific War . . . .

                  *         *         *         *         *

The effect of our seizure of the Mariana Islands upon informed opinion in
Japan was very striking, and it was recognized almost immediately that Saipan
was the decisive battle of the war, and that its loss removed hope for a
Japanese victory . . . .

The First Year

     While headed for the barn at Pearl Harbor from Guam, Vice Admiral
Turner's Staff celebrated its first anniversary.  The blurb in the ship's
Press News of the flagship, the Rocky Mount, announced to all who would read:

No one who participated in the Galvanic Operation will forget Thanksgiving
night, 1943 when the Admiral outwitted and outguessed 8 Jap planes attempting
to attack our formation.  CINCPOA's Air Officer, Colonel Eareckson, termed it
'the most magnificent maneuvering' he had ever seen.

If the Admiral drives his help hard, it is because he does not spare himself.
If he is impatient of incompetence and bungling, it is because his own mind
has the edge and temper of fine steel.

     Few guessed on that day of 24 August 1944, that a year later they would
be in Tokyo.